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Introduction*
A. G. Rud, Jim Garrison, and Lynda Stone
John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont on 20 October 1859 and died in New 
York City on 1 June 1952. Th is issue of the journal celebrates his life and the 150th 
anniversary of his birth. It also represents the commemoration of this anniversary 
by the John Dewey Society (founded 1936). All contributors are members of the 
Society selected for their diversity of interests in Dewey’s philosophy as well as dif-
fering interpretations of his work. 
Born before the Civil War (in which his father served) and dying during the 
Korean confl ict in the Cold War, his life spanned a tumultuous time in U.S. and 
world history in which he was a prominent domestic and global fi gure. Besides his 
many academic books and publications, Dewey wrote hundreds of pieces for the 
popular press, including Th e Atlantic Monthly, Ladies Home Journal, Th e Nation, 
Th e New Republic, Th e New York Times, and such widely read educational jour-
nals as Teachers College Record, Th e Social Frontier, and the Journal of the National 
Education Association. As a social activist, he was involved in the founding of the 
American Association of University Professors, American Civil Liberties Union, 
and the New York City Teachers Union and he presided at the trial of Leon Trotsky, 
among many other involvements.
For decades, he was America’s most public intellectual, perhaps the most 
uncloistered and wide-ranging thinker in the history of the nation. A truly cos-
mopolitan philosopher, his ninetieth birthday was formally celebrated in Canada, 
Denmark, England, France, Holland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, 
and Turkey as well as the United States. Th e ninetieth birthday fund committee, 
designed to raise $90,000 for Dewey to donate as he saw fi t, received contributions 
from people as diverse as cartoonist Al Capp, Justice Hugo Black, Harvard presi-
dent James B. Conant, union leader David Dubinsky, entertainer Jimmy Durante, 
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Albert Einstein, and the actor Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. Th e fi rst message read at his 
birthday dinner was from President Truman. Th e prime minister of India, Jawa-
harlal Nehru, attended while Justice Felix Frankfurter spoke to an assembly of 
some fi ve hundred. At the Columbia University celebration, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
president of the Univ ersity and future U.S. president, called him “the philosopher 
of freedom.”1 Th is issue of the journal celebrates another birthday sixty years later 
at a time when, once again, Dewey’s philosophical reach is global.
Dewey’s grasp was as great as his reach. He made enduring contributions to 
all the major domains of philosophical study including, logic, aesthetics, metaphys-
ics, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and such. He made major 
contributions in psychology as the leader of the Chicago School of functionalism. 
He was elected president of the American Psychological Association (1899) before 
he was president of the American Philosophical Association (1905). He was also 
world renowned for his original thinking about education, declaring in his mon-
umental Democracy and Education that “philosophy may even be defi ned as the 
general theory of education.”2
Oft en called the philosopher of reconstruction, he reconstructed his thought 
slowly but steadily in his lifetime, moving from Hegelian objective idealism to ex-
perimental naturalism and pragmatism. Th e context and course of events sometimes 
led him to dramatically change his mind, as when he recognized his mistake in 
supporting WWI and became a leader in the Outlawry of War movement. Today, in 
the Deweyan spirit, we must critically recover and reconstruct Dewey for our time. 
It is our hope that the present issue will prove a valuable contribution to this goal. 
With this end in mind, we have asked each contributor to provide “refl ections for 
the twenty-fi rst century.” In an eff ort to create a temporal mirror on our times, we 
will provide a brief historical contextualization for each contribution before leaving 
it to readers to draw out their own connections and conclusions.
When Nel Noddings suggests “A Common Faith is arguably one of John 
Dewey’s least eff ective books,” she is probably right. It was a rhetorical failure that 
convinced few people who read it then or more recently. Th e typical response of 
friends and foe alike assumes a rather narrow list of pre-existing categories of pos-
sible religious beliefs or expression, and then relegates Dewey to one or another 
place in the existing conversation, aft er which they praise or condemn him ac-
cording to their preferences. Many seriously misunderstood him. In a review of 
Dewey’s book, the prominent liberal theologian Henry Wieman interpreted him 
as believing in the superhuman, if not the supernatural, such that Dewey “pro-
nounces non-theistic humanism as futile and mistaken.”3 For his part, Dewey saw 
all forms of theism as simply a hypostatization of an abstract noun that expresses 
humankind’s highest ideals (and not an antecedently existing Being). Dewey pre-
ferred imagined ideals that “intervene” in the world to guide judicious, ameliora-
tive action rather that those that “supervene” from beyond to bring metaphysi-
cal comfort and escape from the practical problem of acting to secure enduring 
ameliorative values.
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Th e problem then, as now, is that Dewey attempts to occupy a unique place, a 
distinct topos (locus, place, position) in the classical Greek sense, so he can approach 
the topic in a remarkably new way. Aft er seventy-fi ve years, it remains unclear to 
most whether such a place exists in the religious conversation, which is something 
Noddings’s paper carefully documents. For some, Dewey’s position is, in the ety-
mological sense, a utopia (no place).
In response to Wieman’s review, Edwin Ewart Aubrey assembled an abun-
dance of evidence that Dewey was, in fact, a “non-theistic humanist.”4 Dewey pro-
claimed his “complete approval of Mr. Aubrey’s statement of my position.”5 As 
Steven C. Rockefeller shows in his monumental work on Dewey’s philosophy of 
religion, Dewey is a naturalistic, religious humanist who eschews both secular re-
ductive materialism and the hypostatization of religious ideals.6 Such a stance is 
sure to alienate the two dominant camps in current religious discourse—the secu-
larist and the humanist—as both see religious humanism as an almost impossible 
position to occupy. 
Dewey rejected the dogmatic religious identifi cation of the real and the ideal 
as an antecedent given that completes the quest for religious certainty. He did not 
think religion had any special access to truths closed off  from the evolving meth-
ods of the sciences. Indeed, he did not think there was any special domain of the 
religious at all. For him, any domain of experience can have the qualities of im-
mediate, consummatory religious, and even mystical, noncognitive sense of being 
a part of a larger whole in which each of us can make a creative contribution. For 
Dewey, the religious experience is quite close to the aesthetic experience, which is 
why both feeling and imagination are so important to it.7 He did think that our 
highest imaginary ideals were possibilities that might be actualized through intel-
ligent inquiry, thereby naturalistically unifying the ideal and the real for a time 
within an ever-evolving Darwinian universe.
Dewey sought to establish something like a civic religion, a common sense of 
religiosity appropriate for the public sphere and untrammeled by the partisanship 
of parochial dogma. Traditionally, religion has been divisive. Dewey hoped to har-
ness a common faith around ideals of democracy, social justice, and amelioration. 
Some think this can be done while many do not. Noddings’s paper raises some se-
rious questions that anyone interested in the very possibility of religion, much less 
civic religion, must answer for themselves.
Like Nel Noddings, Larry Hickman looks carefully at Dewey’s A Common 
Faith in a contemporary context. Whereas Noddings situates Dewey within con-
temporary writing about religion, faith, and reason, Hickman relies on recent re-
search from the Pew Research Center. He uses the research questions that drove 
the research in conjunction with the results to create a useful discursive space for 
reaching his conclusions. Many readers will fi nd his distinction between secular-
ism, which he claims actually helps defend religious choice, and secularization, 
wherein religious considerations “cease to function as central factors in the lives of 
individuals,” an engaging idea.
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Unlike Noddings, Hickman thinks that Dewey’s book succeeds philosophi-
cally, even if it has yet to satisfy many readers, whether religious or not. He also 
seems to suggest that the fl ux of history is on Dewey’s side and that his religious 
speculations might yet achieve widespread popularity. Only time will tell. Taken 
together these papers provide the kind of comparison and contrast that introduces 
Dewey’s philosophy of religion and its usefulness for democratic purposes in ways 
that should prove valuable to contemporary readers.
Dewey is a philosopher of culture and Gert Biesta correctly approaches his 
thinking about scientifi c inquiry as a response to the crisis of modern culture. Th e 
crisis arises because modern science depicts a world apart from human purposes, 
values, morality, and aesthetic sensibility. It portrays human feelings as distorting 
objectivity and imagination as confusing the real with the merely possible. At the 
core of this crisis lie such dualisms as those between subject (subjective) versus ob-
ject (objective) and the knower versus the known. Dewey the Darwinian overcomes 
these dualisms by understanding human nature as participating in co-evolving 
transactions with the rest of nature. 
Biesta devotes insightful sections of his essay to explicating Dewey’s par-
ticipatory and transactional realism while calling attention to many of the crucial 
ideas in Dewey’s view of science that his critics oft en overlook. Among others Bi-
esta mentions are Dewey’s emphasis on avoiding diff erent kinds of dualism (e.g., 
mind versus matter and fact versus value), eschewing the “intellectualist fallacy” 
of assuming our primary or only relation to reality is the cognitive (knowing) re-
lation, his recognition that scientifi c knowledge is only one kind of knowledge, his 
insistence on the continuity between common sense inquiry and esoteric science, 
and his fallibilism. Other things astutely discussed in Biesta’s paper, but not explic-
itly named, include what Dewey calls “the philosophic fallacy” (i.e., the mistake of 
confusing the consequential products of our inquiry with antecedent reality) as 
well as Dewey’s claim that all inquiry is theory and value laden. Above all, Biesta 
discusses Dewey’s quest to frame a philosophy of science intimately connected to 
moral and political aff airs.
Dewey’s single most powerful idea for responding to the crisis of culture is 
democracy. He declares: “Th e crisis in democracy demands the substitution of intel-
ligence that is exemplifi ed in scientifi c procedure for the kind of intelligence that is 
now accepted.”8 Th e notion of intelligence Dewey wishes to overcome is the one that 
considers it “an individual possession.”9 Dewey also wished to overcome the associ-
ated notion that there is an antecedently existing rationality apart from existence 
found in either a transcendent (Platonic) or transcendental (Kantian) realm.
Dewey rejected many of the dogmas of modern liberalism along with the ratio-
nalist dogmas of enlightenment rationality. Th ese include the notion of the atomistic 
individual born with innate free will, rights, and rationality. Freedom, rights, and 
rationality (Dewey much preferred the word intelligence) are all cultural achieve-
ments, not antecedent givens. He indicates, “Intelligence is the key to freedom in 
act.”10 We must use intelligence to transform the environment that, transactionally, 
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controls our conduct if we are to secure freedom and rights. Dewey would never 
ignore material conditions. By clarifying Dewey’s thinking about scientifi c inquiry 
as a response to the crisis of modernity, Biesta also helps clarify Dewey’s thinking 
about the crisis of democracy and the democratic individual. 
Beginning in the 1920s, Dewey became increasingly worried that the work 
of the sciences, especially the social sciences, was becoming the province of a small 
set of specialists who turned their results over to bureaucratic experts. Th e result 
is what we today call technocratic government. Increasingly, the result has been 
government for, but not by, the people. Robert Westbrook observes, for Dewey, “[a] 
community was not fully democratic until it had ‘socialized intelligence.’”11 Dew-
ey’s commitments to communication and deliberation lie at the core of this call for 
participatory democracy. Dewey’s oft -used phrase, social intelligence, binds the two 
together. In today’s world, scientifi c understanding drives deliberation. Whatever 
the sciences may mean for the future of capitalism, they mean even more for the 
future of democracy. Democracy requires fi rst-rate science education, but in the 
kind of science that overcomes the crisis of democratic modernity.
For Dewey, the move from Gert Biesta’s paper on science to Craig A. Cun-
ningham’s paper on educational technology does not involve a shift  from pure to 
applied science. Dewey writes: “Th e reproduction of the order of natural changes 
and the perception of that order were at fi rst close together, so close that no dis-
tinction existed between art and science. Th ey were both called techne.”12 Dewey 
the pragmatist fi nds no such dualism. Dewey held a production account of know-
ing. He observes, “In outward forms, experimental science is infi nitely varied. In 
principle, it is simple. We know an object when we know how it is made, and we 
know how it is made in the degree in which we ourselves make it.”13 As Dewey 
indicates, the tradition of “maker’s knowledge” is ancient, and if Jaakko Hintikka 
is right, it includes “doer’s knowledge,” for “no distinction between poiesis and 
praxis is intended.”14 Hintikka goes on to show that in this tradition the distinc-
tion between practical and theoretical reason is also “ambiguous” and may not be 
sharply drawn. Th is is Dewey’s stance as well. Although infl uenced by Aristotle, 
Dewey is as unwilling to allow classical distinctions between value-spheres theoria 
(pure wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom), and techne (craft , skill, art) and their 
respective actions: episteme (contemplative action, pure knowing), praxis (practi-
cal action, overt doing), and poiesis (productive action) to harden into alienating 
cultural diremptions. Dewey does the same with the modern cultural partitions 
(science, ethics, and aesthetics). Mutual interrogation of all domains of experience 
is philosophy as cultural criticism. Th e kinds of questions that Cunningham asks 
about the use of technology in the penultimate paragraph of his paper provide a 
practical example.
Th ere is something else important about technology for Dewey. We cannot use 
technologies (tools) without them altering our personal and cultural identity. Th ey 
transform the customs of a culture and the habits of individual bodies. To learn a 
technology, we must acquire the habits of their use. For Dewey, these habits consti-
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tute the self.15 He calls tools “extra-organic” organs, “that is to say, all the tools and 
devices of all the arts, although outside the body, operate in behalf of the functions 
of life just as do the eye, stomach, hands, and so on.”16 Indeed, extra-organic organs 
provide a great spur to the exercise of individual and cultural intelligence.
Tools may be regarded as a sort of extension of the bodily organs. But the 
growing use of the latter opens a new line of development so important in its con-
sequences that it is worthwhile to give it distinctive recognition. It is the discovery 
and use of extra-organic tools that has made possible, both in the history of the race 
and of the individual, complicated activities of a long duration—that is, with results 
that are long postponed. And, as we have already seen, it is this prolongation and 
postponement that requires an increasing use of intelligence.17
Nowhere today does our democracy need to open up new lines of develop-
ment of intelligence more than in the use of digital technologies. Th is is especially 
the case in the use of instructional technologies in transforming schooling, which 
is why Cunningham’s essay is so important. 
Since Dewey’s philosophy of technology is his philosophy of science, tech-
nology also intimately connects to moral and political aff airs in the ways indicated 
by Biesta. Cunningham’s advocacy of “participatory learning” is very much in line 
with Dewey’s thinking about communicative and deliberative democracy. Dewey 
asserts: “Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social 
intelligence—the power of observing and comprehending social situations,—and 
social power—trained capacities of control—at work in the service of social inter-
est and aims.”18 Cunningham identifi es emergent forms of technology and their 
remarkable educational potential. Training in the use of these new technologies 
yield new capacities of control in accordance with new social interests and aims. 
Th ey are marvelous new ways of educating social intelligence—and a new kind of 
democratic citizen. What Cunningham calls “participatory learning” is a good way 
of learning participatory democracy.
Cunningham calls attention to the emphasis Dewey puts on learning “through 
occupations.”19 Work involves the forms of life available to a culture for transforming 
nature to satisfy human purposes, which is why learning through the occupations 
is so important. Cunningham places special emphasis on massively multiplayer 
online role-playing games (MMPORGs) as expressing well the additive and syn-
ergistic characteristics of emergent educational technologies. Clearly, MMPORGs 
have tremendous capacity for developing social intelligence, as do “distant com-
munications” and “social networking” that he mentions and that, as Cunningham 
puts it, facilitate participation “in a wide variety of socially mediated learning ac-
tivities that could never be imagined in Dewey’s day.”
Th e paper by Jiwon Kim focuses upon what she sees as the dilemma of moral 
education today. How do we make it more eff ective? One way to do this is to look 
to aesthetic experience as consummatory the way that Dewey did and continuous 
with moral experience. Each is enjoyable, responsive, and sensitive to a situation, 
and here the aesthetic and cognitive are brought together, whereas they are usually 
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seen as separate. Kim sees Dewey’s principle of continuity informing this way of 
thinking. Mind and body then become abstractions from the whole, and embodied 
intelligence and empathy for others allows one to see and imagine diff erent pos-
sibilities. Dewey, in his late work, Art as Experience, points out that imagination is 
the chief instrument of the good,20 allowing us to more fully remove prejudice by 
appreciating each person’s as unique and irreducible. 
John Dewey left  for a relatively short trip to Japan and China in 1919 with his 
wife Alice, and ended up spending three months in Japan, followed by two years 
in China. Chinese collectivism and their notion of community deeply infl uenced 
his thought. Hongmei Peng refl ects upon her arrival in the United States and the 
diff ering notions of community that she saw, East and West, and looks to Dewey 
to help her understand community. For Dewey, community is not an aggregation, 
or a congeries. Bonds among community members are more than formal, they 
are material and spiritual. Dewey’s democracy is built upon communication, and 
likewise Peng fi nds this the case. For her, community is based upon inclusive and 
what she aptly calls porous communication. It is, as Peng uses Dewey’s metaphor, 
“a self-tended garden without a fence” because the garden itself is not discrete or 
separate, but is the world itself. Th e question this begs is, how do we share, and what 
do we share? It is necessary to share and share alike to make the foundation of our 
individual development a social milieu. Peng sees in Deweyan community a way 
to address confl ict in today’s world: Face confl ict and resolve it through amicable 
and respectful discussion. She advocates that we acknowledge Dewey’s idea of an 
interdependency of individual and community needed today.
Barbara Stengel fi nds diff erent though related lessons from John Dewey in 
her paper. She sees that Dewey’s ideas about the other, intelligence, and the is/ought 
distinction in ethics form the thought of contemporary critical theorists, feminists, 
and scientists, respectively. Th at Dewey’s thought is viewed statically rather than 
dynamically by such thinkers today contributes to a cultural and philosophical 
amnesia. Like David Hansen and Leonard Waks, Stengel sees Dewey as a model 
for a cosmopolitanism necessary for interacting and fl ourishing in today’s world. 
Dewey actively sought out associations with others who diff ered from him. As 
Stengel says pithily: “Consider Dewey’s travels to Japan, to China, to Russia. He 
didn’t go to speak. He went to live. For several years around 1920 and for periods 
of several months at other times, Dewey (with and without his various family 
members) lived outside the United States.” He lived abroad for extended periods 
of time, most notably in China, but he also cultivated others at home. As Stengel 
and others have pointed out elsewhere, Dewey had a wide assortment of friends, 
correspondents, and associates. He learned from strong women, particularly his 
fi rst wife Alice and also Jane Addams, as well as numerous correspondents. Th e 
somatic healer F. Matthias Alexander assuaged his aches and pains while providing 
Dewey with further data to affi  rm his disagreement with any mind/body dualisms. 
Dewey’s Hegelian intellectual roots are evident in his stress upon the both/and 
over the either/or in his logic, and an embodied way of thinking to always check 
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back to experience, nature, and the lived world. However, she reminds us to take 
to heart the friendly critique of Myles Horton, civil rights activist and founder 
of the Highlander Center in Tennessee. Horton acknowledged his indebtedness 
to Dewey for the path-breaking work Horton undertook for community educa-
tion and civil rights, but denied discipleship. Socrates wished for no followers, and 
Albert Schweitzer suggested the same with his statement to others that one fi nds 
one’s own Lambaréné as he did by establishing a hospital in that Gabonese river 
town. Stengel affi  rms that Dewey tells us much that is valuable 150 years aft er his 
birth and asks us to cut him some conceptual slack, to linger with him. To linger 
with Dewey may mean to listen to what he says, but certainly to deconstruct and 
reconstruct what he says for our time. 
We now live in an era of globalization. One of the concerns about such a 
state of the world is, ironically, that powerful and singular cultural groups will 
dictate the terms of this synthesis. Globalization then becomes a synonym for 
Americanization, where a fl attening of cultural practices and contributions blend 
us all into a large, corporate, transnational culture with little specifi city. We can 
point to commonplace examples of American corporate reach around the world, 
of McDonald’s restaurants in Beijing or a WalMart opening in Accra. Naoko Saito 
is concerned about such American cultural imperialism, but goes deeper than that 
in her paper. She wants to revive pragmatism for our time to account not only for 
the cultural imperialism of corporate infl uence, but also the despair of democratic 
practice, what she terms following, respectively, Emerson and Th oreau, a “silent 
melancholy” and “quiet desperation.” Both Th oreau and Emerson saw the promise 
of democratic enactment as well as the hollow sense of what passes for democratic 
participation. Th ey followed the concerns of Tocqueville about the fl accidity and 
fragility of the democratic impulse and practice in the early republic. Th e erosion 
of the presence and infl uence of propertied farmers troubled Th omas Jeff erson in 
his fi nal years in the early nineteenth century. He thought that the incipient move 
to urbanized and mechanized labor was detrimental to the kind of participation he 
envisioned for the new republic he helped to launch. Yet it was Th oreau who noted 
the mental and spiritual sloth about him, and stated on the title page of Walden, 
“I do not propose to write an ode to dejection, but to brag as lustily as chanticleer 
in the morning, standing on his roost, if only to wake my neighbors up.”
Saito stresses the roots of American transcendentalism in Dewey, particularly 
Emerson, and what she calls, following Stanley Cavell, Emersonian moral perfec-
tionism. Democracy is always underway, impassioned and aimed toward a perfect 
or ideal state in this view, which Th oreau captures more lyrically. It is Emerson, 
too, that Saito uses to “destabilize” Deweyan pragmatism. She fi nds the emphasis 
upon face-to-face democracy and the solving of problems facile and failing to cap-
ture how humans actually relate to the other. Saito believes that Dewey’s call for 
creative democracy “must be addressed also towards the need for humility in the 
face of alterity, in the face of the strangeness of the eccentric, both outside and in-
side of one’s own home, such as to resist the lure of assimilating diff erence into the 
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same.” It is Emerson’s “devil’s child” who jars any common or banal understand-
ing of self and other, as being something as commonplace as another person or an 
unacknowledged part of the self. Dewey’s own encounters with the eccentric have 
been discussed recently21 as well as how much he learned from key women in his 
life, such as his wife Alice and Jane Addams. Saito helps us to see what eff orts must 
be made to reconstruct Dewey for our time.
Recognized for its centrality to Dewey’s thought, the term reconstruction 
appears at times across the essays and introductions in the present volume. While 
Leonard Waks and David Hansen only use it each one time, it seems an appropri-
ate frame to their signifi cant papers on considering Dewey and his philosophy as 
cosmopolitan. In the new introduction from the late forties to the programmatic 
essay, Reconstruction in Philosophy, originally published in 1920, Dewey poses a 
relationship of reconstruction to philosophy thus: 
Today Reconstruction of Philosophy is a more suitable title than Recon-
struction in Philosophy. For the intervening events have sharply defi ned 
. . . the basic postulate of the text: namely that the distinctive offi  ce, prob-
lems and subject matter of philosophy grow out of stresses and strains 
in community life in which a given form of philosophy arises, and that, 
accordingly, its specifi c problems vary with the changes in human life 
that are always going on.22 
Given historical change, new times since the twenties, and at the least diff er-
ent dimensions to problems of community, Waks and Hansen off er “reconstruc-
tions.” In general, they undertake “social philosophy,” according to and applying 
Hickman, posing “reinterpretation . . . [i.e., timely reevaluation] of Dewey’s basic 
insights . . . [for] a new generation.”23 At the least they see, as Waks put it, a cosmo-
politan strain in Dewey that is useful for today.
Consideration of contemporary writings, herein especially by Waks and Han-
sen, demonstrates that there are various approaches with diff erentiated methods to 
interpreting Dewey. In a recent text, Hickman identifi es two “research programs” 
in American pragmatism as classical and neo-pragmatist;24 two others that seem 
viable are neo-classical and historicist.25 Classical and what might be termed neo-
classical readings take Dewey in word and spirit, utilizing his direct writings from 
yesterday for projects today. As do most scholars, Waks and Hansen employ him 
thus; their distinctions come in form and degree of citation and synthesis. Each 
represents standard contemporary accounts and each makes good use of present-
day sources to bolster their positions. Waks off ers greater textual evidence for his 
view and becomes neo-classical in an emphasis on Dewey’s late notion of “agency 
through art.” Hansen posits greater synthesis as he applies a Dewey with “deep and 
abiding interest in the world writ large” to politics and especially education. Both 
rely somewhat on neo-pragmatist reference; this is illustrated in Waks’s critique of 
K. Anthony Appiah’s version of cosmopolitanism and indeed his return to Dewey 
as more concrete and practical. With Hansen’s substantive support as more wide-
ranging, each formulation is strong. 
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What draws Waks and Hansen together is their recognition that Dewey’s 
cosmopolitanism is connected to democracy and thus to education; indeed the 
most direct statement comes from his central and familiar text.26 What is interest-
ing for all three is the question of the relationship of democracy and cosmopoli-
tanism. In answer a fi rst historical point is that any concept of cosmopolitanism 
has not always—and only recently—relied on democracy. Perhaps the second and 
historicist point is that today’s “wide and free society,” cosmopolitan as defi ned by 
Dewey, must be democratic to be cosmopolitan and must be cosmopolitan to be 
democratic. Recall that Dewey’s criteria for democracy are two in tandem, the fi rst 
exclusive communitarian depth of association along with more extensive and in-
clusive ones of interest and action. Intervening events that led to the postmodern, 
globalized world, with all of its complexities, fl uidities, crises and the like in which 
we now live, demand no less. Th ese contributions from Waks and Hansen surely 
are in accord in this 150th birthday celebration of Dewey.
Notes
1. Our description of the details of Dewey’s ninetieth birthday celebration is drawn 
primarily from Martin, Th e Education of John Dewey. 
2. MW 9: 338.
3. For Wieman’s review, see LW 9: 426-434. Others concluded Dewey was simply a 
theist in spite of his staunch naturalist rejection of the supernatural. See Norbert Guterman, 
LW 9: 423-425.
4. For Aubrey’s review, see LW 9: 435-437.
5. For Dewey’s reply to both Wieman and Aubrey, see LW 9: 226.
6. See Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism, especially 
chapters 10 and 11.
7. For instance, see LW 10: 199.
8. LW 11: 51.
9. LW 11: 50.
10. MW 14: 210,
11. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 436.
12. LW 10: 154; see also LW 3: 25. Signifi cantly, Dewey says much the same thing in his 
1938 Logic; see LW 12: 77.
13. LW 1: 319.
14. Hintikka, Knowledge And Th e Known, 80.
15. MW 14: 21.
16. MW 6: 439.
17. MW 7: 188. Understanding tools as “extra-organic” organs also help us better un-
derstand Dewey’s instrumentalism: “Th ere is nothing novel nor heterodox in the notion 
that thinking is instrumental. Th e very word is redolent of an Organum—whether novum 
or veterum” (MW 10: 368). Th e classical Greek word organum means organ as well as in-
strument.
18. MW 4: 285.
19. MW 9: 319.
20. Dewey, Art as Experience, 348. 
21. See Cunningham et al., “Dewey, Women, and Weirdoes.”
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22. MW12: 256.
23. Hickman, Reading Dewey, 9.
24. Hickman, Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism.
25. Th e work of historians considering Dewey may well off er additional categories. See 
Popkewitz, Inventing the Modern Self. 
26. MW 9: 98.
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